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The relative decline of the U.S. as a global economic power is clear, and can be seen 
in the statistics. However, the U.S. decline is nevertheless a slow one, and carries all 
sorts of unprecedented dangers for the world. The U.S. is definitely in a less powerful 
position than previously with respect to production, but it is still successfully 
siphoning off much of the economic surplus (or surplus value) created in the 
developing countries via the operations of its multinational corporations and its 
hegemony over the global financial architecture. With respect to U.S. financial 
dominance, the key issue becomes the continuation of the dollar as the hegemonic 
currency, which is currently threatened by the rise of China. This paper intends to 
critically analyse the performance of the U.S. economy and also the role played by the 
U.S .dollar in the international payment and in reserve currency. The study will also 
examine the expansion of Chinese economy and importance of the gradual 
development of a multicurrency system with the intention of reducing the growing 
balance of payments deficit putting pressure on a single reserve currency. This study 
has followed doctrinaire methodology, which includes analytical, descriptive and 
comparative methods. This article concludes that the U.S. economy is currently 
suffering from a serious trade deficit and the position of the U.S. dollar is under 
genuine threat from the renminbi, the renminbi will not be able to replace the U.S. 
dollar as the global currency for at least the next decade. 
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The relative decline of the U.S. as a global economic power is clear, and 
can be seen in the statistics. However, the U.S. decline is nevertheless a slow 
one, and carries all sorts of unprecedented dangers for the world. The U.S. is 
definitely in a less powerful position than previously with respect to 
production, but it is still successfully siphoning off much of the economic 
surplus (or surplus value) created in the developing countries via the operations 
of its multinational corporations and its hegemony over the global financial 
architecture. With respect to U.S. financial dominance, the key issue becomes 
the continuation of the dollar as the hegemonic currency, which is currently 
threatened by the rise of China. (Wade 2017, Economist 2015) The U.S. share 
of the global domestic product is estimated at less than 20%, while U.S.-based 
companies control about half of the world‟s wealth (World Bank 2017).  
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Of course, these facts show us a very complex picture of the contemporary 
world. A recent study by Bullard et al. (2017) points out that the U.S. economy 
is still the world‟s largest economy and, according to them, between 2008-15 
there was an average annual shortfall of 20% in fixed capital investment due to 
the 2008 crisis, which adversely impacted on GDP growth by an average of 
10% (Bullard et al. 2017). Needless to say, the U.S. has by far the largest 
military in the world. It controls – largely through the role played by its 
military sector in technological development – the most advanced technologies 
in the world (Harvey 2005).  
For major G7 economies, the average growth rates experienced were all 
over 3% between 1960-80; however, in 2016-17, U.S. growth was 1.7%, the 
Eurozone area saw 1.8% growth, and Japan, 1.1% (World Bank 2017: 4, Table 
1.1). Wien (2010) commented about the U.S. economic decline in key areas 
like, the “return on investment” from an estimated 15% in the post-war period 
to 10% by the end of the 1980s; by the end of 1990s, it was said that the return 
was only “5 percent and few would put money at risk for that reward” (Wien 
2010). 
This paper intends to examine the performance of the U.S. economy and 
also the role played by the U.S. dollar in the international payment and in 
reserve currency. The U.S. dollar is, at present, the dominant reserve currency 
of the country‟s central banks. The U.S. Treasuries market is the most liquid 
financial market in the world, which makes Treasures an attractive investment 
for holding central bank reserves. The U.S. dollar is also the dominant currency 
for invoicing international trade and is also used in denominating the majority 
of foreign debt securities (Fine 2013). The study will also examine the 
expansion of Chinese economy and importance of the gradual development of 
a multicurrency system with the intention of reducing the growing balance of 
payments deficit and lessening of pressure on a single reserve currency. A 
multicurrency reserve would even help developing countries to diversify their 
foreign exchange currency holdings; hence, should a country accumulate a 
huge amount of U.S. dollars and find that confidence in the dollar declines, 
then they can merely switch to other reserve currencies. This reduces the 
demand for single reserve currency. 
This paper also aims to analyse the Chinese currency and its potential to 
become an international reserve currency. However, China needs to improve 
the efficiency of its financial sector and financial market (Subacchi 2016). The 
challenges will be whether increased demand for the renminbi would lead to its 
appreciation and consequent loss of export competitiveness in the global 
markets. This study has followed doctrinaire methodology, which includes 
analytical, descriptive and comparative methods. The research is drawn from 
the use of past documents to understand the subject area and in the process it 
becomes evident that the methods utilized depend not only upon the 
researchers‟ perspective, but also on the time and available resources.  
The relative strength of the U.S. economy supports the value of its 
currency. In fact, this was an important reason for the US dollar emerging as 
the most powerful currency after World War II. At the end of the World War 




II, the US accounted for half of the world‟s GDP and with Europe and Japan 
destroyed by the war, the US was the only country with a developed 
manufacturing sector to produce goods needed by the consumers. As Western 
Europe and Japan began to recover from the war, the US relative economic 
strength started to decline. By the 1980s, West Europe and Japan caught up 
with the US in the terms of productivity. In the 1990s, the dominance has 
remained due to the rising amount of US dollar debt owed by domestic and 
foreign borrowers and creditors in countries in the rest of the world.   
Despite the slowdown of the U.S. economy in recent decades, more than 
one-third of the world's gross domestic product still comes from countries that 
peg their currencies to the dollar; indeed this includes seven countries that have 
adopted the U.S. dollar as their own. Furthermore, more than eighty-five 
countries maintain their currencies in a tight trading range relative to the dollar. 
In fact, the U.S. GDP makes up only 25% of the global GDP and U.S. trade 
volume in only 15% of the world‟s total trade in 2017. But still the U.S. dollar 
remains the predominant currency used in world trade and financial 
transactions. For example, the U.S. dollar makes up nearly 63% of central 
banks‟ reserve currency holdings, against 17% for the euro and 2% for the yen 
(Siddiqui 2018a, World Bank 2017). In the foreign exchange market, 90% of 
forex trading involves the U.S. dollar. The dollar is of course just one of the 
world's currencies, but most of these currencies are only used inside their own 
countries. Theoretically, any one of them could replace the dollar as the world's 
currency, but this is unlikely as they are generally not widely traded. At 
present, nearly 40% of the world's debt is issued in the U.S. dollars (World 
Bank 2017, Willett and Chiu 2012).  
The history of international reserve currencies shows that there is a 
tendency in the past for one currency to dominate global trade and finance, and 
any change to the status quo is often reflected in shifts in its economy and 
global power politics (Harvey 2005). This means that there has been a strong 
incentive to choose a currency that other trading countries are able to accept 
and use for international transactions. However, a dominant currency can lose 
its hegemony to another due to changing economic and political dynamics. For 
example, the British Pound Sterling was a leading international currency before 
World War I – more precisely between 1860 and 1914 – when more than 60% 
of world trade was invoiced and settled in Pounds Sterling, and a similar trend 
was seen in the holdings in the global foreign exchange reserve. Once Britain 
became colonial power, it encouraged colonial administration to use Pound 
Sterling and thanks to the associated favourable policy of support, Sterling then 
flourished. (Kaldor 1971) In 1914, Britain stopped using the gold standard but 
returned to it in 1925 at a pre-war parity under pressure from British financial 
capital, which wanted such parity; at that time, Britain had colonies to support 
such moves, but such alternatives were not available after the war, so the 
Pound Sterling was over-valued and Britain started facing balance of payment 
problems. To extricate itself from this, Britain imposed wage deflation and 
reduction in domestic absorption on its workers so that its exports would be 
cheaper and imports more expensive. The then strong trade unions did not 




accept this and called for a general strike in 1926, soon after Britain returned to 
gold standard. The current situation differs from earlier periods because the 
advanced economies do not have direct colonial possessions (Siddiqui 2019b).    
In the beginnings of World War I, the balance of Sterling accounted for 
less than half of total official foreign exchange holdings, while the French 
Franc accounted for about a third and the German Mark about one-sixth. 
Between the 1920s and 1930s, these two currencies (Pound and Franc), along 
with the U.S. dollar, dominated the demand for international reserve 
currencies. Historically, very large UK‟s current account deficits have been 
sustained for long periods of time, as seen during the late 19th century. The UK 
was also exporting huge amounts of capital to countries such as Australia, 
Canada and Argentina. Some critics were worried that UK investors were 
lending and exporting capital at the neglect of the domestic markets. This was 
primarily due to the lack of higher returns in the domestic economy (Siddiqui 
2019a, Kaldor 1971). 
During World War I, the UK economy understandably experienced a deep 
crisis and its current account and fiscal deficits and external debts rose sharply. 
These developments affected the British Pound adversely. Soon after World 
War I, the U.S. dollar took over as the leading international currency, but it was 
not until end of the World War II (i.e., 26 years later) that the dollar became 
the dominant international currency, replacing the Pound Sterling as the 
principal international currency (Kaldor 1971). At present, similar situation can 
be seen in the U.S. economy, where the U.S. trade share in the global economy 
has declined significantly; nevertheless, other countries are still using the U.S. 
dollar as an invoicing currency, which keeps the ex-post prices of goods 
similar to those of its competitors, and further provides hedging benefits. Safe 
heaven depositors have not been influenced by recent developments in the US 
economy, even after the Standard and Poor downgraded the US credit ratings 
in August 2011.  
Currently, the U.S. economy is experiencing deep structural difficulties. 
The question facing other countries‟ governments now is whether they will go 
on buying and holding U.S. securities in large amounts. For more than six 
decades the U.S. has maintained its financial hegemony (Fine 2013), where no 
other asset was seen as attractive as U.S. dollar by the overseas investors; 
however, things are now changing, with the Eurozone, for instance, providing 
as large a liquid market as the U.S. The Euro economy is the same size as that 
of the U.S., but at present accounts for a larger share of world trade.  
Since the euro emerged as the single currency of the Eurozone countries, a 
single euro has consolidated, rather than fragmented, national currencies (prior 
to 1999). It seems the euro has emerged as a second important useful currency 
to be used as a reserve by the country‟s central banks. In 2010, the euro‟s share 
as a reserve currency was 26%, as compared to 61.8% for the U.S. dollar for 
the same year (Siddiqui 2019b). In 2010, East Asian currency traders 
conducted 93% of their transactions in foreign exchange markets, as these 
markets also happened to have seen the largest shares in global growth. All 




these factors have boosted the demand for U.S. dollars (Wolf 2008, Harvey 
2005). 
Further, in reference to debt, the U.S. official indicates that as a share of 
GDP, U.S. debt has greatly increased in recent years. The proportion of debt to 
GDP may drop due to government surplus, inflation or growth in GDP. As of 
October 2018, the US public debt stood at $15.8 trillion; at the same time, 
intragovernmental holdings stood at $5.8 trillion. Further, in 2017, U.S. debt 
was about 77% of its GDP which was the 43rd highest in the world. By 2028, 
the ratio would be 100%, or even higher if present policies will be extended 
past the scheduled expiration date. Further, by December 2017 45% ($9.3 
trillion) was held by foreign investors, with China having the largest share of 
$1.18 trillion, followed by Japan at $1.06 trillion. (OECD 2019, Willett and 
Chiu 2012) 
The use of the U.S. dollar as an international reserve currency heightens 
the so-called Triffin dilemma. With increasing trade there are also demands for 
international reserve increases. Hence, the reserve-issuing country needs to 
continue to run a balance of payments deficit in order to meet the increasing 
demand for its currency; as a consequence, the reserve-issuing country‟s 
external debts rise sharply. According to the researchers, an international 
currency must satisfy three key criteria, which are: medium of exchange, unit 
of account, and store of value (Patnaik 2009). In the short term, it appears that 
the U.S. Dollar and euro are likely to remain the dominant international reserve 
currencies. The greatest challenge is currently seen to be a lack of dynamism 
within the eurozone economy, and it is unlikely the euro will ever represent an 
alternative to U.S. Treasury, also in part due to the eurozone‟s current 
economic crisis, especially in the southern EU countries. The Japanese yen, 
which had high levels of foreign exchange reserve of 8% in 1990, soon 
declined due to the long-term stagnation of the Japanese economy; in 2010, the 
reserve in the yen was merely 3.7%.  
The Chinese renminbi could emerge as the new international currency with 
the country‟s growing economy and trade. The Chinese economy has increased 
its share in the global economy. In the coming decades, it is hoped that China‟s 
economy will take over that of the United States. China has increased reliance 
on international trade, with both its exports and imports consistently rising; it is 
expected that its trade will grow further in the future. China‟s export baskets 
include manufacture products and its currency could be used for global 
exchange.  
Flexible exchange rates and free capital movement have been unable to 
keep the world economy stable. The emerging economies have built up 
massive foreign exchange reserves principally in order to protect themselves 
from panic capital withdrawals (Siddiqui 2018b), as seen during the 1997 East 
Asian crisis and again after the 2008 financial crisis. Such sudden withdrawal 
of capital proved to be costly in terms of their investment, economic growth 
and overall development. This uncertainty also adds to global imbalances. Lee 
(2014: 43) noted: “The fast growing economies of developing Asia are 
providing an important source of global production and demand. Asia‟s 




emerging and developing economies maintained an average annual growth rate 
of 6.8% over 2000-10. In 2010, Asia (including Japan) accounted for about 
27% of global GDP, up from mere 12% in 1960. By comparison, in 2010, the 
United States contributed 23.1% and the European Union (EU) 25.8% to the 
world GDP”.   
The emerging economies have kept reserves in dollar denominated assets. 
The continuous rise in foreign reserves in foreign countries has led to an 
increase in demand for U.S. financial assets, which is tied to the ever-rising 
inflow of funds into the U.S. financial system from abroad, which encourages 
asset prices bubbles; also, excessive reserve accumulation overseas is due to 
developing economies trying to self-ensure against possible speculative 
currency attacks. This caution is due to the East Asian crisis of 1997, and the 
desire to guard against sudden investment collapse or to keep currency from 
appreciating as this could adversely affect export competitiveness (Wade 
2017). A large number of emerging market economies borrowed heavily in 
dollars when American interest rates were at rock-bottom levels (Huang and 
Kishor 2019, Siddiqui 2017). The result was credit-driven growth, which starts 
to look fragile when – as now – the Federal Reserve is raising interest rates and 
the U.S. dollar is strengthening (Siddiqui 2018c).  
Despite some of these countries‟ efforts to build-up foreign exchange 
reserves over the past decades, the shortages of US dollars as capital inflows 
into these economies resulted in a reversal of capital flows into developed 
economies. All these developments led to an increased cost of borrowing in the 
dollar. The Stiglitz Commission (United Nations 2009) argued for the creation 
of a new global reserve system based on Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). The 
Commission report recommended that during recession the role of the SDR 
should be increased through IMF lending to those countries in need of short-
term finance (Stiglitz and Greenwald 2010). 
Since the 2008 crisis, the interest rates in the advanced economies have 
been maintained at almost zero levels in order to revive their economies, which 
meant that the flow of capital from their economies to the emerging economies 
became more profitable. Such capital flows have taken the form of equities and 
loans. Therefore, if the currencies in emerging economies depreciate, then asset 
holders from the advanced economies will be affected (Siddiqui 2016a,b). Any 
depreciation of the local currency will thus start panic and result in capital 
flight from the emerging economies. This means international capital is not 
interested to see depreciation take place (Patnaik 2009). 
 
 
Performance of the U.S. Economy 
 
The current account provides an overview of transactions between a 
country and its foreign trading partners resulting from the purchase and sale of 
goods and services produced in the current period. If the United States has a 
current account surplus, this means that America is selling more goods and 
services to foreign markets than they import goods purchased from foreign 




markets. Typically, since 1996, the U.S. has a negative current account 
balance, or current account deficit (See Figure 1), while, Germany, Japan and 
China have current account surplus. When there is a current account deficit, the 
United States must borrow the liabilities to pay for goods and services 
purchased from abroad. The external debt rises as a result of current account 
deficits. However, exchange rate changes may not be adjusted according to the 
direction of balance of payments. If the current account is in deficit but there is 
also a large amount of capital inflow in capital account surplus, the currency 
will not devalue but will rather appreciate, thereby exacerbating the balance of 
payments deficit. If the balance of payments deficit is caused by a current 
account deficit, it will inevitably lead to fewer jobs in export-related sectors 
and a downturn in the economy. If the balance of payments deficit is caused by 
capital account and financial account deficit, however, this would mean a lot of 
capital outflows and a tight supply of domestic capital, which would result in a 
rise in interest rates and a decline in the economy. 
According to Amadeo (2018), the main contributors to the deficit are 
consumer products where, in 2017, the U.S. imported consumer products worth 
$602 billion, while exports totalled $198 billion. This could be explained by 
the decline in competitiveness of U.S. products which was largely the result of 
the devaluation of the Chinese yuan, making Chinese products cheaper than 
U.S. products. In an effort to bridge this gap, President Trump enacted his 
policy of protectionism measures (Siddiqui 2018a), in particular imposing 
tariffs against the imports from China and Mexico (Amadeo 2018). 
 
Figure 1. Current Account Balance, Total, % of GDP, 1996 – 2018 (Source: 
Main Economic Indicators: Balance of Payments) 
 
Source: OECD Retrieved from https://data.oecd.org/trade/current-account-balance.htm 
[Accessed 10 February 2019]. 
Figure 2. United States Long Term Interest Rates, Total, % Per Annum, May 






Source: OECD Data. Retrieved from https://data.oecd.org/interest/long-term-interest-
rates.htm.. [Accessed 10 February 2019]. 
 
 
Figure 3. Real GDP Long-term Forecast, Total, Million US Dollars, 2020 – 
2040. 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook: Statistics and Projections: Long-term Baseline Projections. 
Retrieved from https://data.oecd.org/gdp/real-gdp-long-term-forecast.htm. [Accessed 2 March 
2019]. 




China, Japan and Germany are willing to go on buying enough U.S. 
Treasuries and other dollar assets to finance U.S. deficits and sustain the U.S. 
dollar. In response to the bursting of the financial bubble around 2000, the 
Federal Reserve cut U.S. interest rates 13 times in two years, from 6.5% to 
3.5% (see Figure 2). Low interest rates have prompted Americans to invest 
their savings in assets and banks to lend too much, contributing directly to the 
continued expansion of the U.S. housing bubble. 
Once the dollar loses its status as an international currency, there is no 
doubt that it would depreciate substantially. The United States will be unable to 
repay its external debt. China, as the largest of American creditors, will lose a 
lot of money. Transparency in U.S. financial markets and predictability and 
credibility in monetary policy have strengthened the dollar‟s position. Unlike 
many other economies, the current structure of the U.S. economy also allows it 
to reasonably tolerate a persistent trade deficit, so the dollar will remain the 
main foreign exchange reserve for a long time.  
As the crisis deepened in the 1980s and 1990s, neoliberal capitalism was 
adopted in the major capitalist countries. This led to undo the gains of the 
previous decades, especially in terms of income distribution. For instance, in 
the U.S. the income share of the top income group (1%) declined from 29% in 
1929 to 8% in 1970 and remained about same until 1979, while the lower and 
middle income group experienced a greater rise in their incomes. In contrast, 
the neoliberal regime pursued since the 1980s reversed the redistributive 
policy. For instance, the income share of the top 1% in the US then rose very 
sharply to 23% by 2008 (Wade 2009). 
Ten years ago, the financial crisis in the United States led to a global 
economic crisis in 2008. This financial crisis was caused by the exposure of 
risks in the U.S. house market, which led to a nearly vertical downward shift in 
the U.S. dollar index. Emerging economies have been affected by the severity 
of the global economic financial shocks because the current global reserve 
system fails to ensure adequate international liquidity (Lee 2014). The global 
financial crisis of 2008 showed weaknesses in the current monetary system and 
it has contributed to global financial instability and ultimately adversely 
affected the global economy. For developing countries, which heavily rely on 
trade and capital inflows for their economic growth, the failure of the global 
reserve system with insufficient international liquidity led them to witness 
difficulties in the aftermath of the global financial crisis (Costigan et al. 2017). 
In fact, the rate of accumulation responds to the rate of profits in the 
economy when profit rate increases, meaning higher expected returns from 
expanding capital stocks. The profit rate fell during the 2008 crisis, but after 
2013 profit rates rose again, but have fallen slightly again since 2014. The 
recovery of 2012-14 was associated with debt-financed consumer spending, 
which is not sustainable in the long run. The 2014 recovery took place when 
consumer spending accelerated while investment in the economy slowed, 
government spending also declined in real terms over the period, exerting 
adverse pressure on output growth. During this period, U.S. imports grew 
faster than exports, therefore the biggest factor to have contributed to the recent 




growth in U.S. GDP is household consumer spending, i.e., contributing 81% to 
its increase in the period 2014-17 (Kotz 2018), while investment slowed to 
2.1%, contributing only 16% to growth in GDP growth over the same period. 
As Kotz argues that “The current structural crisis has taken the form of 
stubborn stagnation despite unprecedented monetary stimulus, with slow 
economic growth, a low rate of capital accumulation, stagnating real wages and 
worsening economic insecurity for working people- conditions that have 
helped to produce new political polarization” (Kotz 2018: 30). 
The high dollar, and indeed other factors, had led to an extraordinary 
decrease in the manufacturing competitiveness of the U.S. (Glyn 2005). The 
„strong dollar‟ policy seen in the 1990s had proved to be more important in 
terms of attracting capital for the „new economy‟. It was observed that the 
overseas purchase of U.S. assets, including assets and bonds, rose sharply (i.e., 
four-fold) between 1989 and 2000. The massive capital inflow was due to 
foreign investors seeing this as an excellent opportunity to make higher profits 
that the latest US technology was expected to bring. More than a decade ago, 
Krugman (2007: 437) noted, “The United States has a remarkably large current 
amount deficit, both in absolute terms and as a share of GDP. At the moment 
the country is not having any difficulty attracting capital inflows sufficient to 
finance this deficit, but many observers nonetheless find that deficit worrisome. 
This worriers see an ominous resemblance between the current U.S. situation 
and that of developing countries that also went through periods during which 
capital flows easily financed large current deficits, then experienced „sudden 
stops‟ in which capital inflows abruptly ceased, the currency plunged, and the 
economy experienced a major setback”. 
The widening gap between U.S. economic and financial power is creating 
difficulties for the rest of the world. This is because the costs of dollar 
dominance are beginning to outweigh the so-called benefits. The U.S. share of 
global merchandise imports declined from 16% in 2005 to 13% in 2016. The 
US was the biggest export market for only 32 countries in 2016, which 
declined from 44% in 1995, while for China this has risen from 2 to 43% for 
the same period (Economist 2015). Bernanke‟s „saving-glut‟ thesis, where he 
argued that U.S. overspending caused the U.S. trade deficit, was due to this the 
money flowing into the U.S. market from other countries through its capital 
account. This would lead to credit expansion and lower interest rates, making it 
attractive for U.S. consumers to overspend, and as a result U.S. household 
consumption increased global demands. Here it is being emphasised that the 
U.S. trade deficit gave rise to excessive global savings. Until this issue is 
addressed, reducing global imbalances by raising U.S. savings would lead to a 
global slump and, ultimately, recession. Bernanke also argued that high saving 
rates in surplus countries, especially in East Asian countries, are due to 
historical, cultural and demographic factors, while others pointed out that the 
East Asian crisis has been an important reason for such behaviour. Others 
emphasise the fact that excessive global savings are due to structural causes 
and cannot be corrected simply by these measures (Wade 2017). 




In recent years, we find there has been an upward shift among the foreign 
investors who would like to invest in U.S. assets. As long their demands to 
invest in U.S. dollars of their accumulated wealth exist, this will lead to the 
generation of large capital inflows into the U.S. economy. The official statistics 
show a substantial role of overseas capital in financing the US current account 
deficit, but private bond purchases also play a large role as well. The sharp rise 
in the U.S.. Treasury Bond yields the fact that the interest rates set by the U.S. 
Treasury have risen from 1.86% in 2017 to 2.84% in 2018, after Trump 
became US President. In 2016, U.S. economic growth was 1.5%, while the 
EU‟s growth was 2% and China‟s was 6.7% for the same period. In 2017, U.S. 
economic growth was 2.3%, while the EU‟s average growth was 2.5%, and 
China‟s, 6.9%.There seems to be a strong correlation between the growth in 
U.S. output and the percentage of net fixed investment in the U.S., meaning 
that in the long term it would not be possible for the U.S. economy to 
accelerate without an increase in net fixed investment. For example, in 1966, 
during the long-term boom, the U.S. net fixed investment was 11.3% of U.S. 
GDP, but in 1978 U.S. net fixed investment was 10.5% of U.S. GDP. In 1984, 
this same figure was 9.2%, then 8.3% in 1999, 7.9% in 2006 and, in 2017, 
4.2% (Kotz 2018). 
The U.S. power reached unprecedented levels at the end of World War II. 
From the 1960s, however, this dominance started to decline in what was then 
known as the “loss of China” and as Europe and Japan began to recover from 
the war and the post-war decolonisation in Africa and Asia moved towards 
national sovereignty within former European colonies. By the 1970s, the global 
economy was becoming tripolar: North America, Europe, and Japan. In the last 
decade, there has been further erosion due to rise of China. However, despite 
the dramatic transformation in China and the rise of its share in the global 
economy, and indeed its economy emerging as the second largest worldwide, 
China remains a poor country whose average income is quite low compared to 
the developed economies (Siddiqui 2015). 
Securitisation is an issue related to collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) 
by banks which began to take off in the late 1980s and became increasingly 
prevalent in the run-up to this 2008 crisis. CDOs are created from portfolios of 
debt pooled together by banks, the ownership of which is transferred to a 
“special purpose vehicle” (SPV), a temporary company formed for that 
purpose. This SPV then issues bonds which are sold on to investors. The 
process is dubbed securitisation because bonds are an example of a security (a 
tradable financial asset). Essentially, the loan repayments act as a stream of 
income to the ultimate investors, while, for the bank, the debt is sold on, 
recouping the cash and allowing it to issue more loans. There are, in addition, 
lucrative fees available to those overseeing the process. Prior to 2007, the 
riskiest “tranches” of the bonds issued by SPVs, and hence the most attractive 
to speculators, often included large numbers of subprime mortgages. The 
amount of CDOs issued globally rose from $68 billion in 2000 to $521 billion 
in 2006 (Norfield 2016: 140). As a recent European parliament report put it: 
“Securitisation amplified the crisis by contributing to lengthening the 




intermediation chain, by creating conditions for incentives and interests 
between participants in the securitisation chain to be misaligned, by increasing 
the reliance on mathematical models and on external risk assessments and, 
finally, by increasing both individual and systemic bank risks” (Delivorias 
2016: 14). 
Moreover, through securitisation there has been an explosive growth in 
derivatives. These consist of assets that change in value depending on what 
happens to some underlying asset. For instance, a “credit default swap” 
compensates the holder in the event of a specific debt defaulting, in return for 
which they pay a small regular fee to the counterparty. This can be a useful 
form of insurance, “hedging” against a risk. However, derivatives can be 
bought and sold for purely speculative reasons by people who are not exposed 
to the underlying risk and simply wish to gamble on whether or not something 
will happen. In the run-up to the crisis, the derivatives market was dominated 
by interest rate contracts (which pay out as rates move), followed by CDSs. 
Again, the market in derivatives has not recovered to the peak levels seen 
immediately prior to the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, but nor has the 
growth been entirely reversed. In the first half of 2016, the gross market value 
of “over-the-counter” derivatives (the money required to replace them at 
market prices) still stood at $12,690 billion, roughly where it was in early 2007 
(Delivorias 2016: 14). 
The expansion of credit generally helped both to conceal and to defer 
capitalism‟s problems in the period from the early 1980s, as part of a system 
sometimes dubbed “privatised Keynesianism”, but only at the expense of 
creating a grotesquely oversized financial system that would ultimately 
explode into crisis. The fact that the long depression began in the field of 
finance led many commentators to identify it as simply a financial crisis. (Fine 
2013, Keynes 1980) After the 2008 financial and economic crisis, the U.S. 
Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the European Central Bank launched 
quantitative easing programmes or, in the case of the Bank of Japan, expanded 
an existing programme. Quantitative easing involves central banks 
electronically creating money and using it to purchase assets from banks and 
other financial institutions, in particular acquiring government bonds. Doing so 
has two effects. First, it floods the banking system with liquidity, supposedly 
encouraging lending. Second, it drives up the price of bonds. Bonds pay a fixed 
income at regular intervals, so, if they increase in price, their “yield”, the return 
on the investment relative to the price, tends to fall. Lower yields mean lower 
borrowing costs. Rapid accumulation takes place in conditions in which 
investors believe that production will be profitable. Instead, money was either 
squirrelled away by the banks or streamed into financial investments, though 
often high-yielding, risky investments. 
Despite the persistence of high levels of sovereign debt in the U.S., no 
country is willing to challenge the dollar as the representative international 
currency. As Patnaik notes, any alternative to the dollar as an international 
currency in the current set-up will need a country to challenge the status quo. 
He argues that the fall in the value of the dollar in terms of oil could lead to the 




decline, and finally replacement, of the dollar. At present, there is no attempt 
nor, it seems, any interest among major dollar holders or among top major 
economies to seek an alternative. Currently, the major creditors to the U.S., 
namely China, Japan, Germany and oil exporter Middle Eastern countries, rely 
heavily on the U.S. markets to prop up their own domestic demand and 
economy. In the U.S., real wages have fallen since 2008 but domestic demand 
has continued to grow thanks to household borrowing and domestic and 
international sources (Patnaik 2009). 
The U.S. government has the privilege of paying its debts in its own 
currency rather than in some other currency. This means that this eases 
pressure on the U.S. to reduce deficits and regulate its banks. As Wade (2009: 
545) notes: “The U.S. government‟s privilege of paying its debts in its own 
currency rather than in someone else‟s softens the pressure on it to cut its 
deficits and get its banks working. The U.S. central bank can just print even 
more than it has been doing, reducing the pressures for adjustment and raising 
the potential for a later inflationary surge. The outcome could be stagflation in 
the USA and damage to countries that hold dollar assets in their foreign 
exchange reserves.” 
The U.S. dollar reserve constitutes up to 70% of the world‟s foreign 
exchange reserve. The rapid expansion of the dollar by the U.S. did not lead to 
hyperinflation in the country. This large additional amount of dollars is being 
used to boost foreign exchange reserves in emerging economies. Furthermore, 
huge amounts of U.S. dollars are used in the trade of mineral, oil, gas, and 
agricultural commodities. The prices of these commodities fluctuate. The 
countries who import these commodities in large quantities will thus be 
affected by the rise in price of the U.S. dollar due to imported oil prices. As      
D‟Arista (2009: 634) argues “the key currency status of the dollar appeared to 
offer significant advantages for the USA, questions about its sustainability 
have been raised almost since its inception. Any country that issues the global 
medium of exchange will experience capital inflows and the resulting 
investments in its credit instruments will increase the availability of credit and 
allow its residence to spend more and save less. But the steady stream of 
capital inflows can only continue if the key currency country is able or willing 
to run the trade deficits that allow other countries to earn the currency they 
hold as international reserves. Over time, growing imbalances between the 
external debt of the key currency country and the surpluses of other countries 
tend to push the system to breaking point. The ballooning internal debt of the 
reserve currency country – particularly of its household sector – strains its 
capacity to import and undermines the value of its currency both literally and 
in terms of its role in the global economy”. 
According to D‟Arista, (2009) the functions for the dollar required that 
dollar/gold exchange rate be fixed and unchangeable, but in the absence of 
rival currencies convertible into gold ensured that the dollar would also emerge 
as an international medium of exchange used in transactions between third 
countries and an international store of value. Further D‟Arista (2009: 641) 
argues: “Dollar reserves had to be invested in U.S. financial assets to earn 




interest and earnings on reserves augmented the supply, the amount of 
investments in the U.S. financial assets also grows. Private dollar holdings 
were also returned to the U.S. and held as working balances with US banks to 
pay for trade with the U.S. and the third country. Surplus private funds were 
invested in time deposits or money market assets or Treasury bills. In time the 
return flow of dollars to the U.S. provided more credits than its economy could 
use. The outcome was lower U.S. interest rates, economic expansion and a 
rising rate of inflation. Excessive inflows also encouraged an even larger 
volume of capital outflows by the U.S. residence that put pressure on dollar 
exchange rate”. 
Keynes‟ proposed in 1944 that international clearing was the key problem 
in the international system due to lack of liquidity. He viewed the need to make 
a system that would favour expansion rather than contraction and ultimately 
would not restrain domestic policy. He opposed the idea of building a system 
which relies on one dominant currency as reserve assets to minimise the 
governmental influence and prevent the collapse of foreign national reserves as 
occurred in 1928. His suggestion was that the accounts of both debtors and 
creditors would be interest-bearing so that the burden of adjustment would be 
shared by both countries. (Keynes 1980) For instance, creditor countries would 
make deposits of the current account surpluses they did not wish to spend and 
thus create an additional supply of funds for debtor countries to borrow. 
However, his plan was rejected then by the US. (D‟Arista 2009) 
Any other country pursuing such a strategy of huge fiscal deficit would 
witness an outflow of finance as the “investors‟ confidence” in that country 
would be undermined. However, the U.S. dollar is still considered “as good as 
gold”. This is due to a number of reasons, including the home base of global 
finance itself and its global military domination.  
World currency can be divided into three distinct categories: 1) advanced 
economy currencies, e.g., the U.S. dollar was considered as good as gold by 
other investors and asset holders; 2) other advanced economies‟ currencies 
such as the euro, pound sterling; and 3) developing countries‟ currencies, 
which were expected to depreciate over time. When India wants to buy a 
commodity from South Africa, then India first exchanges Indian rupees for 
U.S. dollar and uses these dollars for payment. However, when a U.S. firm 
buys something from India, then it can use own national currency (i.e. dollar) 
for the payment.  
Since the 2008 crisis, the interest rates in the advanced economies have 
been maintained at almost zero levels in order to revive their economies, which 
meant that the flow of capital from their economies to the emerging economies 
became more profitable. Such capital flows have taken the form of equities and 
loans. Therefore, if the currencies in emerging economies depreciate, then asset 
holders from the advanced economies will be affected. Any depreciation of the 
local currency will thus start panic and result in capital flight from the 
emerging economies. This means international capital is not interested to see 
depreciation take place. 
 




The Performance of the Chinese Economy 
 
The Chinese economy is now the world‟s second-largest economy. It is 
also the second-largest global trader and currently holds the largest amount of 
foreign exchange reserves. In recent years, the Chinese economy has accounted 
for more than one-fifth of incremental demand worldwide. The question also 
arises as to whether the greater use of the renminbi as an international currency 
is directly associated with the future of the US dollar.  
China has, over the last three decades, enjoyed massive growth to become 
the leading economy in the world by nominal GDP (See Figure 3). As noted by 
the World Bank (2017), since the introduction of economic reforms in 1978, 
China has experienced increased industrialisation which made construction and 
industry the main contributors to GDP. However, in later years, the tertiary 
sector has become the main GDP contributor, accounting for about 46.1%, 
while the secondary sector represented 45.0% of total output. Up to 2015, 
China had remained the fastest growing economy worldwide, reporting growth 
rates of about 10% per annum. In 2017, China had a GDP of $23.12 trillion, 
representing an increase of 6.8% from the previous year (Amedeo 2018). 
According to the World Bank (2017), China‟s GDP accounts for about 33% of 
global growth.  
Since 1980s, the rapid growth of China‟s share in the global economy has 
risen sharply and the whole East Asian region has witnessed its highest growth 
rates. If the region is integrated into a free trade zone and these countries use 
their own currencies, this will have an adverse impact on U.S. interest, 
including the use of dollar as a foreign exchange. To safeguard dollar 
hegemony, the U.S. has, accordingly, been active in the region. (Siddiqui 2015) 
The last four decades of rapid growth in China has tremendously increased 
both its productivity and trade. Moreover, the country has accumulated large 
amounts of liquidity in the capital market. China‟s rising trade and investment 
abroad led to the increased financialization and internationalisation of the 
renminbi. With Asia seeing high growth and being an economically fast-
growing region, this could open the possibility of a regional free trade zone and 
also the possibility of forming an Asian currency that could be used in trade 
and as a foreign exchange reserve. Such a development would ultimately 
undermine U.S. dollar hegemony in the region.  
It is estimated that should the current scenario continue, China will 
overtake the U.S. by 2030 to become the biggest economy in the world. The 
World Economic Forum (2018) also noted the country‟s per capita GDP has 
continued to converge in relation to that of the U.S., although at a moderate 
rate. However, the country‟s growth rate has decelerated since 2013 when it 
grew by 7.7%, declining in subsequent years to 7.3%, 6.9% and 6.7% in 2014, 
2015 and 2016, respectively. In recent years, China has emerged as the biggest 
foreign buyer of U.S. Treasury bills and U.S. dollars, and will perhaps go on 
buying to prevent a dollar crash. In order to escape the „dollar trap‟, the 
Chinese government should be worried about the sharp fall in the value of 
dollar. It is suggested that China has sold around between U.S. $50 bn and 




$100 bn U.S. dominated assets each month since 2009 and bought assets such 
as agricultural land, mines and corporate stocks in Asia, Africa and Europe 
(Wade, 2009). China is also advancing credits to oil companies in Brazil, 
Dubai, and Russia, which they will repay in oil. 
China was one of the poorest countries in the world before 1980 in a 
closed economy. However, since the Chinese economic reform of the 1980s, 
the Chinese economy has been growing rapidly. China‟s current GDP is nearly 
70 times what it was in 1980. The current world is an open economy, wherein 
the trend towards economic globalization is developing rapidly. Economic 
globalization not only promotes economic cooperation among countries, but 
also affects close economic development between countries. Due to different 
national conditions in China, the direct impact of the international financial 
crisis on Chinese economic development is relatively small. Chinese GDP 
seems to keep rising, even when most other countries saw a decline during the 
global financial crisis. In 2013, President Xi Jinping of China proposed that the 
"Belt and Road" is becoming an important link for Chinese international trade 
with the world. China‟s One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative and the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are intended to increase regional trade 
but also increase the use of the renminbi, as any currency needs to first gain 
foothold as a regional currency before becoming a global currency (Siddiqui 
2019c).  
The Chinese currency has become the fifth-largest international currency 
since 2016, when the International Monetary Fund formally included the 
renminbi in the SDR basket. The circulation and use of RMB is mainly 
accompanied by the rise of tourism. China sees a large number of its tourists 
visiting various countries every year, so there are more and more shops in these 
countries where the RMB can be used to buy goods. Judging from the current 
world situation, no country‟s currency can hope to match the dollar in the near 
future with the possible exception of the yuan. The euro was the most likely to 
replace the dollar, but after the 2008 economic crisis, it was somewhat 
weakened. The financial crisis in the European countries lead to a weaker euro 
and left them unable to compete with the dollar in terms of international market 
share. In addition, although the Japanese yen and UK pound are important 
internationally, the productivities of these two countries are low, making it 
difficult for either to assume the role of the world‟s major currency. (Siddiqui 
2019b, Subacchi 2016) 
China‟s export clears in renminbi reached 26% in 2018. Furthermore, with 
the increasing renminbi deposits around the world, the demands on renminbi 
financial products have also been increasing in recent years. It is estimated that 
by 2030, the Asia-Pacific region will account for 40% of global GDP and two-
thirds of the global middle class. China‟s number of middle class is expected to 
rise to six hundred million by 2020. (Subacchi 2016) This would mean China 
and the Asia-Pacific will be the largest consumer market for goods. It is also 
expected that within next few years, due to these changes, the renminbi will 
become the major trading and clearing currency in the Asia-Pacific region.  




China‟s financial system, fiscal policy and the management of its foreign 
exchange is in government control and thus the government still maintains 
macroeconomic autonomy despite the fact that the country is an active 
participant in the WTO and global financial capitalism (Siddiqui 2015). 
 
 
Internationalisation of the Renminbi 
 
Over the last four decades, the renminbi went from being virtually 
inconvertible to becoming one of the few major recognised global currencies. 
Although exchange rates have been controlled by the Chinese central bank 
since 1981, they have gone through different forms of managed convertibility. 
For example, from 1981 to 1994, a number of devaluations were enacted to 
boost exports. Between 1994 and 2005, the renminbi was virtually pegged to 
the U.S. dollar at a fixed rate. Between 2005 and 2010, this peg shifted to a 
basket of currencies, and in 2014 the band of fluctuation around the exchange 
rate target set by central bank was widened. (Subacchi 2016) The 
internationalisation of the renminbi is being gradually pursued through a 
number of polices. For instance, control of capital account has been aimed at 
easing monetary inflows and outflows, establishing offshore exchange centres, 
where foreign institutions can exchange the currency with Chinese banks, 
whereby China has made a series of currency swaps with trading partners, 
establishing a mechanism for payment of exports and imports without using the 
U.S. dollar.  
Russia radically decreased its U.S. dollar holdings to very low levels last 
year, and this is seen as a move to boost renminbi and yen reserves. Russia‟s 
central bank more than halved its dollar reserves in 2018 and moved $44 bn 
each into the renminbi and the euro and $21 bn into yen (See Figure 4). This 
move came soon after the U.S. passed sanctions in April, where Seddon notes: 
“after the passed sanctions in April that knocked 20 per cent off the rouble‟s 
value against the dollar and saw investors scramble to cover against future 
measures that could affect sovereign debt and popular stocks.” (Seddon 2019) 
There seems to be a clear change in Russia‟s foreign exchange holdings, with a 
large shift towards the renminbi. Russia had only 0.1% total reserves in the 
renminbi in June 2014, which only one year later had risen to 15%. The 
renminbi holdings yield is 3.20% compared to 0.35% for the U.S. dollar. 
The Economist (2015: 15) noted about the U.S. dollar that “For 70 years 
the dollar has been the superpower of the financial and monetary system … As 
a means of payment, a store of value and a reserve asset, nothing can touch it. 
Yet dollar‟s rule has brittle foundations, and the system it underpins is 
unstable.” The U.S. accounts for 23% of global GDP and 12% of merchandise 
trade. Yet around 60% of the world‟s output and a similar share of world‟s 
population lie within the dollar zone, i.e., in which currency is pegged to the 
dollar. The US firm‟s share of the stock of international corporate investment 
has fallen from 39% in 1999 to 24% in 2015 (Economist 2015). 
 




Figure 4. Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserve 
 
Source: IMF Data. Available at https://data.imf.org/?sk=E6A5F467-C14B-4AA8-9F6D-
5A09EC4E62A4. 
 
In the 1970s, the French government termed the dollar “America‟s 
exorbitant privilege”. In the light of the 2008 financial crisis, Eichengreen 
(2011) noted that other countries question whether the U.S. should have been 
allowed to run current account deficits approaching 6% of GDP prior to the 
crisis. Emerging economies are critical in the sense that as their economies 
expands; they are under pressure to raise dollar reserves for any unexpected 
eventualities. They are compelled to provide cheap finance for U.S. external 
deficit. The cheap foreign money keeps U.S. interest rates low and thus 
subsidies the U.S. Eichengreen argued that the inter-war experience was that a 
reserve currency status can change if a new dominant power emerges. Earlier it 
was thought that Europe might challenge the dollar‟s hegemonic role. At 
present, this looks less likely and the sharp rise of the Chinese economy and 
the fact that it is now a larger exporter than the U.S., holds massive foreign 
reserves (in dollars), and its GDP, when converted at the current exchange rate, 
could match the U.S. by 2025. 
Since the U.S. dollar is the accepted international currency, other countries 
would naturally like to hold reserves in it. The demand for U.S. assets, 
primarily Treasury Bonds, is thus higher than it otherwise would have been, 
thereby lowering interest rates for U.S. borrowing, which Eichengreen 
estimated to be up to 1 percentage point in the last decade, which is equivalent 
to an annual benefit of 0.1% of its GDP. Eichengreen (2011) suggested that 
there is a strong possibility of a convertible renminbi as early as 2020. The 
U.S. is troubled by its continuing balance of payments and budget deficit, and 
also by mounting foreign and domestic debts. All these would adversely affect 
the future importance of the U.S. dollar, as happened nearly one hundred ago, 
when the British Pound Sterling lost its global role due to the weakening of 
British economy. It is not beyond possibility that the US dollar could 
experience a similar future. According to Boltho (2011: 147), “There is no 
doubt, threats to America (not quite) hegemonic position and the U.S. dollar 
could crash should foreign investors, and primarily China, suddenly lose faith 
in the currency. But this would not be in no ones‟ interest. China is the first to 
realize that a dollar collapse would leave it doubly poorer; its massive U.S. 




Treasury Bond holding would be worth a good deal less in domestic currency, 
and its export competitiveness would suffer a huge blow”. Eichengreen (2011) 
predicts a world of multiple international currencies, with the euro and 
renminbi playing more significant roles at the regional level.  
In 2009, China‟s central bank (the People‟s Bank of China) began a 
programme in a few Chinese cities to allow trade to be settled with Hong 
Kong, Macao and 10 other East Asian countries in renminbi. By 2011, this 
programme was expanded to an increasing number of Chinese cities and, 
indeed, to additional countries. As a result, there was a sharp rise in trade from 
3 bn renminbi to 535 bn renminbi in 2010 and to total of 2.1 trillion renminbi 
by 2012. China also has signed currency swap agreements with 20 countries, 
and it is hoped that such agreements will further increase the use of the 
renminbi. Jenkins and Zelenbaba (2012: 523) note: “Over 3-5 years, overseas 
lending in RMB would be further accelerated, with restrictions on investment 
in Chinese property, stock and bond markets gradually being eased as financial 
sector development strengthened over 5-10 year period… The process would 
eventually culminate in a fully convertible RMB, suggestive of the fact that 
Chinese officials remain steadfast, however, cautious, along the course of 
internationalizing their currency”. 
Despite the use of the renminbi rising in recent years, it still does not have 
the particular advantage of the US dollar which is its ability to profit from the 
global markets. However, as China‟s financial assets are more 
internationalised, the more Chinese economy is financialised. In fact, whilst the 
OBOR initiative will help China to find markets for its excessive production 
capacity, it will also help to achieve economies of scale and to build the 
comparative advantage of globally competitive markets (Siddiqui 2019c). The 
government facilitates OBOR and outflows of Chinese capital to invest in new 
markets overseas. The country must build regional institutional arrangements 
in finance and currency exchange, as the U.S. did soon after the Second World 
War, which is known as the Bretton Woods system. Such a move facilitated 
U.S. exports of goods into international markets. China attempts to build AIIB 
and also other institutional arrangements relating to exchange agreements 
between the renminbi and other regional currencies. Such measures would 
build a non-U.S. trading clearing system. Furthermore, such a large 
infrastructural project would require credit creation, financing and clearing 
tasks, but the risk is that such huge profits may drive the financial sector to 
over-expand and over-stretch itself in an attempt to create quality renminbi-
based financial assets (Hung 2013). Over-expansion of the financial sector may 
have an adverse impact on the real economy, leaving it vulnerable to financial 





Ten years ago, the financial crisis in the United States led to a global 
economic crisis in 2008. This financial crisis was caused by the exposure of 




risks in the U.S. house market, which led to a nearly vertical downward in the 
U.S. dollar index. Emerging economies have been affected by the severity of 
the global economic financial shocks because the current global reserve system 
fails to ensure adequate international liquidity (Lee 2014). The recent years, a 
growing disappointment with the functioning of the international financial 
system and with the U.S. dollar remaining dominant in facilitating the build-up 
of global current account imbalances has been seen (Mason 2018); this was the 
case even before the 2008 crisis. At the same time, the Chinese accumulation 
of dollar assets and its rapidly growing trade and participation in the global 
economy, and also the increase in the use of the renminbi in trade, indicates 
significant impending change in the world economy. With the rapid slowdown 
of the performance of the U.S. economy and trade, there are concerns being 
raised about the dollar as the single dominant reserve currency and the 
asymmetry in adjustments to shocks. There is no mechanism for adjustment, 
especially real exchange rate adjustment in surplus countries (Jenkins and 
Zelenbaba 2012). 
It seems that Kaldor is describing the current state of US economy rather 
than nearly 50 years ago. As Nicholas Kaldor noted: “The persistent large 
deficits in the United States balance of payments-given the universal role of the 
dollar as the medium for settling inter-country debts-acted in the same way as a 
corresponding annual addition to gold output… So long as countries preferred 
the benefits of fast growth and increasing competitiveness to the cost of part-
financing the United States deficit and so long as a reasonable level of 
prosperity in the United States could be made consistent with the increasing 
uncompetitiveness of United States goods in relation to European and Japanese 
goods, there was no reason why any major participants should wish to disturb 
these arrangements” (as cited in D‟Arista 2009: 645). According to him but as 
the US products were displaced by other countries both in US and overseas 
market and to maintain prosperity would require budget and balance of 
payment deficits. Few years later he notes, “If continued long enough it would 
involve transforming a nation of creative producers into a community of 
rentiers increasingly living on others, seeking gratification in ever more useless 
consumption, with all the debilitating effects of the bread and circuses of 
Imperial Rome…” (as cited in D‟Arista 2009: 645).  
The Study has found that the U.S. dollar still accounting for two-thirds of 
all foreign exchange reserves and the United States‟ ability to run large current 
account deficits has turned out to be a calamity. Once the dollar loses its status 
as an international currency, there is no doubt that the dollar will depreciate 
substantially. The United States will be unable to repay its external debt. China 
as the largest American creditors will lose a lot of money.  
This article concludes that the U.S. economy is currently suffering from a 
serious trade deficit and the position of the U.S. dollar is under genuine threat 
from the renminbi, the renminbi will not be able to replace the U.S. dollar as 
the global currency for at least the next decade. However, the next 10-15 years 
may well see the coexistence of Chinese currencies with the U.S. dollar, 




especially in the Asian region. It may take at least 20-30 years before there is a 
real possibility of replacing the U.S. dollar. 
The study suggests that the policy should be set to seek profit in the real 
economy rather than „finance financing finance‟. Finance should be made less 
globalised. In fact, the pressing issue in dealing with global imbalances is to 
find ways to recycle the saving of surplus economies back into their own 
economies to be invested in developmental projects which would increase 
demand and income and create employment and will also make them less 
dependence of export-led growth. In the U.S., there is a need to increase public 
spending rather than rely on debt-fuelled private consumption to resolve 
inadequate aggregate demands. Greater investment in skills and education will 
increase labour productivity which will positively impact profit rates, as 
occurred during the post-war period under regulated capitalism, while rising 
wages, consumer and government spending would result in higher investment 
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